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ABSTRACT
In recent decades organized crime has ceased to be an isolated issue concerning only 
a single country. The negative consequences of this phenomenon spread out of the 
state borders and cause a  danger for public security, democratic institutions and 
economic stability. The struggle against organized crime requires the coordinated 
cooperation of the law enforcement, judiciary and other institutions responsible for 
the prevention, detection, prosecution, and sanctioning of the criminal activity.
The article studies some aspects of this phenomenon in Brazil. It discusses the 
factors that have contributed to the development of organized crime in this most 
influential country of South America. The paper also examines various initiatives 
that have been taken by Brazilian authorities in the efforts to combat organized 
crime.
KEYWORDS: organized crime, Brazil, struggle against organized crime, violence.
RESUMEN
En las últimas décadas el crimen organizado se ha convertido en un importante 
problema para la seguridad internacional. La delincuencia organizada representa 
una gran amenaza para la seguridad pública, a las instituciones democráticas y para 
la estabilidad económica. La lucha contra este fenómeno requiere la cooperación 
policial y judicial en materia de prevención, detección, investigación y sanción de los 
delitos cometidos por organizaciones criminales.
El artículo presenta y analiza algunos aspectos relevantes del crimen organizado 
en Brasil. Además, describe los factores que han influido en el desarrollo de la 
delincuencia organizada en este país. El artículo examina también las iniciativas 
tomadas por las autoridades brasileñas para combatir el crimen organizado.
PALABRAS CLAVE: crimen organizado, Brasil, lucha contra crimen organizado, 
violencia.
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In recent years organized crime has become an important transnational pro-
blem affecting the global system and international relations. It is estimated to 
generate 870 billion dollars a year, an amount equal to 1.5 percent of global 
gdP (unodc 2011), through illegal activities such as human trafficking, the 
smuggling of migrants, illicit drugs, environmental crime, illegal arms, etc.
There is no generally accepted definition of this phenomenon. even the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted 
by general assembly on the 15th november 2000, does not contain a precise 
definition of organized crime (unodc 2004). This lack of definition was in-
tended to allow for a broader applicability of the convention to new types of 
crime, because organized crime is flexible and capable of adopting itself very 
quickly to new environments.
Organized crime in Brazil – determinants
In 2013, Brazilian authorities proposed their own definition of organized cri-
minal group. according to law no 12850, it is a structured group of four or 
more persons, characterized by the informal division of tasks, acting in order 
to obtain, directly or indirectly, a  financial or other material benefit for an 
offence punishable by a penalty involving deprivation of liberty of at least four 
years or for an offence of the transnational character (lei no 12850).
some authors suggest that origin of organized crime in Brazil relates to 
criminal phenomenon known as cangaço from the late 19th and early 20th cen-
turies. This term was used to an organized band of poor peasants who inhabi-
ted the northeast Brazil. It was a form of “social banditry” against the govern-
ment. The bands very often invaded cities and small villages in order to rape, 
rob and commit homicides (oliveira fernandes 2012: 46–47). 
other experts draw attention on the jogo do bicho, an illegal gambling 
game which had grown into a lucrative business and exerted a significant im-
pact on the Brazilian organized crime. It was created in 1892 by baron João 
Batista viana de drummond, who opened first zoo in rio de Janeiro. to at-
tract customers, he started a daily raffle with gate prizes (long 1988). The ra-
ffle soon became the lottery and because of the link between the 25 animals in 
the zoo and the numbers the lottery became known as a jogo do bicho – “the 
animal lottery” (casas-Zamora 2013: 45). according to law no 3688 of 1941, 
the game was raised to the category of a penal crime. However, the law has not 
been rigorously enforced and due to its huge popularity the jogo do bicho has 
expanded during the 20th century throughout the country. nowadays it is or-
ganized by a small group of entrepreneurs in each state (roth 2017: 381) and 
it is estimated to be a 3.7 billion dollars business annually (Pearson 2016). ac-
cording to Bruno wilhelm speck, jogo do bicho is also a territorial crime, with 
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local bosses fighting for control of this illegal business. The leaders of these 
criminal organizations are called bicheiros (casas-Zamora 2013: 46). The bos-
ses invested part of their enormous earnings in activities like the financing of 
samba schools and football clubs. But other than that, bicheiros have expanded 
their business into illegal activities like prostitution, money laundering and 
murders (The economist 2012). 
at the beginning of the 1970s, with the entrance of large quantities of cocaine 
into Brazil, links began to emerge among bicheiros, colombian drug cartels and 
local criminal groups. Brazil became an important transshipment point for 
drugs, destined for the united states and europe, and an important local drug 
market (Penglase 2014: 16). It is worth adding that the federative republic of 
Brazil shares half of its 16145 km-long borders with the world’s three biggest co-
caine producers: Bolivia, colombia and Peru. according to experts, Brazil is the 
world’s second largest consumer of cocaine and crack, behind only the united 
states, and accounts for twenty percent of the worldwide market for cocaine and 
its derivatives (Jordan 2012). Moreover, cocaine is shipped from Brazil to africa 
and to european markets. The port of santos is a major transshipment center 
for the drugs – it is estimated that around 80 percent of the cocaine arriving in 
europe transits through santos (woody 2018).
some authors suggest that there is a strong relationship between factors 
such as social exclusion, poverty, income inequality and the incidence of cri-
me in Brazil. Brazil has made a  considerable progress in reducing poverty 
and improving living conditions from the beginning of the 21st century. In 
the same time, gdP per capita (at Purchasing Power Parity) has risen by 68 
percent (world Bank 2018). nevertheless, the high level of income inequali-
ties is still one of the most widely recognized aspects of Brazilian society. for 
instance, gInI Index in Brazil was reported at 51,3 in 2015 and it was the 19th 
highest out of 156 countries worldwide (cIa The world factbook). another 
example: it is estimated that six richest people in Brazil have the same wealth 
and equity as the 100 million poorest Brazilians (Margolis 2017).
The Brazilian Institute of geography and statistics (IBge) shows that 
25.4% of the Brazilian population, more than fifty-two million, live in extreme 
poverty, according to the criteria established by the world Bank. Moreover, 
there is a significant correlation between social exclusion and ethnicity and 
colour. The residents of housing units formed by black or brown women, 
without a partner, with children aged up to 14 are the most at risk of poverty 
(agência IBge 2017). 
authors point out that improvement of some social indicators, like life 
expectancy (from 65.3 years in 1990 to 75.7 years in 2017) (undP 2018), 
illiteracy (percentage of persons aged 15 and over, who can read and write 
has grown from 74.6 in 1980 to 91.7 in 2014) (world Bank 2015) or access to 
sanitary service and education does not lead to lower crime rate. 
In 2017, Brazil beat its own previous record (from 2016) for homicides 
– 63,880 people were murdered (darlington 2018). The average national ho-
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micide rate was 30.8 killings for every 100,000 people (see graph 1). Most of 
the homicides occurred in urban centers, particularly in the poorest states of 
the north and northeast regions. The state of rio grande do norte had the 
highest murder rate in 2017, with 68 murders per 100,000 people, followed by 
acre, with 63.9 per 100,000 people and ceará, with 59.1 per 100,000 people 
(stargardter, Berlowitz 2018). These rates were two times higher than the na-
tional average. More than 90 percent of homicide victims were men, and the 
age group of 15 to 29 years accounted for nearly 60 percent of all victims (wai-
selfish 2016: 49). what is more, for every 100 Brazilians that are killed, 71 of 
them are black or mixed race (cnn español 2018). 
some authors indicate the influence of such factors like social inequali-
ty, a  low level of education, a  lack of access to good-paying jobs, the zona/
neighborhood of living and a colour of the skin on the level of violence. In 
their opinion, these factors relate mainly to afro-Brazilians, who historically 
had access to very poor-quality education, which resulted in the lack of pos-
sibility to find a high-paying job. Higher levels of economic poverty increase 
the chances of this population living in poor and stigmatized neighborhood 
(Kassab, rosen 2018: 16). The members of the gangs very often are recruited 
from among such people. for instance, the non-governmental organization 
observatório de favelas has been analyzing, from the beginning of the 21st 
century, the profile of people, who work for criminal organizations in rio de 
Janeiro. according to their surveys, examined gangs have been mainly com-
posed of young black or mixed-race men, born into big families – usually led 
by a woman – of lower income, who dropped out of school and had experien-
ces with precarious jobs before getting into crime (The Brazilian report 2018). 
It is believed that the defective penitentiary system has also influenced the 
development of the organized crime in Brazil. This is illustrated by the fact, 
that the most powerful criminal groups, including Primeiro comando da ca-
pital (Pcc) and comando vermelho (cv) were founded in prisons. 
source: own elaboration on the basis of Intentional homicides (per 100,000 people), world 
Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/vc.IHr.Psrc.P5?locations=1w, access: 3.10.2018; 
stargardter, Berlowitz (2018). 
Graph 1. 
Homicide rate in Brazil 
2000-2017 (per 100,000)
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comando vermelho is the oldest of Brazil’s major criminal organizations. 
It was born out of an alliance between common criminals and leftist militants, 
imprisoned in candido Mendes prison (Ilha grande island) under the mili-
tary dictatorship (1964–1985). By 1979, the group had spread out of the prison 
and had been operating in the slums of rio de Janeiro. Members who were on 
the outside were tasked with providing money to those on the inside through 
criminal activities (Insight crime 2018). In 1980, the prison authorities trans-
ferred several members of the cv to other prisons in rio de Janeiro state. 
as a result, the cv’s organizational methods and ideology were spreading very 
rapidly to all of rio’s prisons (Kontos, Brotherton 2008: 16). nowadays co-
mando vermelho sells cocaine and other drugs in the slums under its control 
(mainly in rio de Janeiro) (ellis 2018: 89). 
Primeiro comando da capital is the Brazil’s largest criminal organization, 
with an estimated 30,000 members (adorno, costa 2018). The Pcc was for-
med in the wake of the most tragic prison riot occurred in casa de detenção 
de são Paulo (“carandiru”) on the 2nd of october 1992, in which Brazilian po-
licy forces killed 111 prisoners (Kontos, Brotherton 2008: 18). Initially, it was 
a  self-defense and advocacy organization in response to prison conditions 
(ellis 2018: 88). since its inception in the beginning of 1990s, the power of 
Pcc grew steadily, reaching its height in 2006 (albanese, reichel 2014: 69). 
on the 12th of May 2006, the criminal organization launched a coordinated 
series of more than 250 attacks in about seventy prisons across são Paulo sta-
te in protest after the transfer of some members of Pcc to remote facilities. 
Moreover, gang leaders ordered the supporters outside the prison to organize 
attacks on police headquarters, buses and public buildings. The five-day series 
of attacks resulted in 115 deaths, including 40 police/prison guards, 71 suspec-
ted gang members and 4 civilians (Prada 2006). nowadays, Primeiro coman-
do da capital is considered to be one of the most important criminal organi-
zations in south america, with significant influences in Bolivia, Paraguay and 
Peru (ellis 2018: 89). 
The chronic overcrowding is one of the most serious problems facing Brazil’s 
penal system. The country is now ranked third among countries in the world 
with the most people in prison, behind only the united states and china (IcPr 
2018). from the beginning of the 21st  century, Brazil’s prison population has 
risen three times, from 232,755 to 690,722 prisoners (IcPr Brazil 2018). This 
massive rise of the prison population has been associated mainly with two 
trends: the expanding use of pre-trial detention and harsh punishment for drug 
use and possession (leeds 2016). furthermore, human rights defenders draw 
attention to bad prison conditions, including poor sanitation, inadequate access 
to food or potable drinking water, poor medical care, mistreatment of prisoners 
by prison staff or even the tortures (Hrw 2013). all these factors create a fertile 
ground for organized criminal activities. according to experts, Brazil’s prisons 
are largely controlled by gangs and very often gang leaders continue to run their 
criminal networks from their prison cells (flynn, Palermo 2017). 
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crime in Brazil doubled, from 113 billion reais to 285 billion reais. In 2015, the 
total cost of public security, private security, insurance and productive losses, 
juridical processes, loss of capacity, imprisonment and medical expenditures 
related to crime costs amounted to 4.38 percent of Brazil’s gross domestic pro-
duct (secretaria-geral da Presidência 2018).
Fighting against organized crime
as it has already been mentioned, in the 1980s and 1990s, organized crime in 
Brazil has risen markedly. for this reason, the legislative changes were introdu-
ced to allow the effective prosecution of organized crime and fight against drug 
trafficking (godoy 2017). 
In 1995, the Brazilian authorities adopted law no 9034, which defi-
ned and regulated evidentiary and investigative procedures relating to cri-
mes arising from the activities of criminal groups or bands (lei no 9034). 
It provided new tools for the law enforcement, such as controlled action 
(delaying the arrest of a suspect until a better moment in order to obtain 
evidence) or free access to fiscal, banking, financial and electoral docu-
ments and information (costa 2007:77). the next legal act, law no 10217, 
adopted in 2001 (lei no 10217), modified law 9034 and added new ins-
truments in the fight against organized crime groups, such as electronic 
surveillance and wiretapping or undercover operations (costa 2007:72). 
However, law no 9034 and law no 10217 did not contain a precise defi-
nition of “organized crime”.
In 2013, Brazilian authorities adopted the above-mentioned law no 12850, 
which defines “criminal organization”, provides regulations for criminal investi-
gation, the means for obtaining evidence and the criminal trial procedure which 
can be applied to such organizations. This law also applies to the criminal offen-
ces recognized by international treaties or conventions, when the criminal ac-
tivity is initiated in Brazil and the result has occurred or should have occurred 
abroad; and vice versa. 
Promoting, constituting, financing or integrating a criminal organization, 
directly or indirectly, is punishable by deprivation of liberty for the term of 3 to 8 
years. The punishments are increased if the actions of the criminal group involve 
the use of firearms or if a person leads a criminal organization. apart from the 
means already established by law, the following means of evidence collection are 
allowed: conclusion of plea bargaining agreements; capture of electromagnetic, 
optical or acoustic signals; controlled action; access to the bank, financial and 
fiscal secrecy; infiltration by police officers performing activities of investigation 
or cooperation among institutions and federal, district, state, and municipal or-
gans in search of evidence and information of interest for the investigation or 
criminal proceedings.
285
The Efforts to Combat  
Organized Crime in Brazil
Edyta Chwiej
The Brazilian legal system established other important legal provisions rela-
ting to preventing and combating organized crime. There are several examples 
that could be mentioned: 
●	 The Brazilian criminal code – law no 2848 of 1940
● law for the Protection of victims and witnesses – law no 9807 of 1999
●	 Money laundering law – law no 9613 of 1998; amended in 2012 (law no 
12683)
●	 law no 11343 of 2006, creating the national system for Public Policies on 
drugs.
The fight against organized crime requires strong collaboration between 
the public security institutions. according to the constitution of the federative 
republic of Brazil of the 5th of october 1988 (article 144), the following agen-
cies are responsible for maintaining public order and the safety of persons and 
property: the federal Police, the federal Highway Police, the federal railway 
Police, the state civil Police, the state Military Police and fire Brigade  (cons-
tituição da república federativa do Brasil de 1988). The federal Police (around 
15,000 members; Muggah 2016: 7) are intended to investigate criminal offenses 
against the union, Brazilian federal government, its organs and companies, fight 
against interstate or international crime, prevent and repress smuggling and 
drug trafficking and protect the country’s borders.
However, some experts point out that constitution assigns to the state po-
lice forces the responsibility for the investigation of the vast majority of crimi-
nal activities (costa 2007: 70). The state police are divided into the civil (some 
123,403 members) and Military Police (over 400,000 active members; Muggah 
2016: 7). The Military Police units are the uniformed forces which patrol the 
streets and maintain public order (costa 2007: 70). The civil Police investigate 
crimes and prepare cases for prosecution (riccio, skogan 2017: 9). 
according to Ignacio cano, through the division into the civil and Mili-
tary Police, “neither force carries out the ‘complete cycle’ of public security, from 
prevention to combating crime, which leads to problems of overlap and of riva-
lry between them” (cano 2006). This researcher also indicates other problems, 
which could make the fight against organized crime less effective: insufficient 
investment, leading, among others, to poor wages for the lower ranking police 
officers, poor training for police officers and high degree of corruption in the 
public security institutions (cano 2006). 
another author, John crocitti, states that policemen’s salaries (mainly in the 
Military Police) are often a few dollars above the minimum wage and some of 
the policemen work additionally as private security guards or as “militiamen” 
(crocitti 2012: 486). Militias (milícias) are groups, which often include former 
and current armed state agents (policemen, prison guards, firemen, etc.). at the 
beginning of the 21st century, these groups started operating in rio de Janeiro 
(Phillips 2018) and they have taken control of small territories, charging resi-
dents and small business owners a  fee for the “protection” of them, and mo-
nopolizing most economic services (like supply of water and gas, or Internet 
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because they also reduce street crime and drug dealing. However, in reality most 
of them are involved in the organized crime activities (Barrionuevo 2008). 
non-governmental organizations point out that the fight against organi-
zed crime in Brazil is sometimes connected with undue violence of police, 
unlawful killings and mistreatment of detainees (Hrw 2017). at least 5,012 
people were killed by the police in Brazil in 2017, according to the Brazilian 
forum for Public security1; it was 19 percent more than in 2016. at the same 
time, the number of murdered police officers has fallen by 15 percent to 385 
(velasco, caesar, reis 2018).
on the other side, many police officers complain about low pay, old equip-
ment, unstable employment and hard-working conditions (Thaty, doederlein 
2017; resende 2018). The policemen also point out that they risk their lives 
every day, but their work is unnoticed and undervalued. on the contrary, their 
errors are scrutinized and overexposed in the mass media. Moreover, Brazilian 
policemen complain about the impunity of criminals and the inefficiency of ju-
dicial institutions (Barbara 2014). 
Besides the law enforcement, the primary institutions of the criminal justice 
system are prosecution, defense lawyers and the courts. according to the cons-
titution (article 92), the organs of the Judiciary Power are the federal supreme 
court, the superior court of Justice, regional federal courts and the federal 
Judges, the specialized courts (labour, electoral, and Military) and Judges, the 
courts and Judges of the states, of the federal district and of the territories. 
The federal supreme court is the highest judicial authority. It is responsible, 
above all, for safeguarding the constitution. among other duties, it has also 
jurisdiction to prosecute and judge in case of criminal offenses committed by 
the President of the republic, the vice-President, the members of the national 
congress, its own Judges, the attorney-general, the Ministers of state and the 
commanders of the navy, the army, and the air force. Moreover, it has original 
jurisdiction to decide extradition requests from foreign states (article 102).
Below the federal supreme court is the superior court of Justice, whose 
responsibility is to standardize the interpretation of federal law. It also has the 
power to prosecute and judge in criminal cases which concern the governors 
of the states and of the federal district, its own Judges, the Judges of the federal 
regional, electoral and labour courts, members of local account courts and 
members of the federal Public Prosecutor office. additionally, it is the highest 
court of appeal for cases with non-constitutional subjects (article 5). The fe-
deral supreme court and the superior court of Justice have jurisdiction over 
the federal and state courts. In the first instance, the cases (civil and criminal) 
are analyzed by federal or state Judges. appeals are then sent to the regional 
federal courts, the courts of Justice, and the courts of appeal – the final two 
organs in the state courts. 
1  fórum Brasileiro de segurança Pública – non-governmental organization set up in 2006.
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according to article 127 of the constitution, the Public Prosecution is a per-
manent institution, whose task is to defend the juridical order, the democratic 
regime and the inalienable social and individual interests. It operates at federal 
and state level. The federal Public Prosecutors act in the federal courts, in-
vestigating and prosecuting federal crimes (e.g., international drug trafficking, 
money laundering, smuggling, human trafficking, environmental crimes) and 
the crimes committed by the employees of federal institutions. The state Pu-
blic Prosecutors, acting in the state courts, investigate and prosecute murders, 
robberies, frauds, and all the offenses not reserved to the other courts (Borges 
de Mendonça 2014: 63–64).
In accordance with the constitution, the arrested person shall be entitled to 
have the assistance of a lawyer. Moreover, the state shall provide full and free-
of-charge legal assistance for low income population (article 5). Brazilian citizen 
must prove a lack of financial resources in order to obtain a free assistance from 
the Public defender office, organized at the federal or state level. This legal assis-
tance can, among others, defend the citizen in civil or criminal cases before the 
Judiciary and present appeals to tribunals or judge cases.
source: own elaboration on the basis of Índice de confiança na Justiça Brasileira (relatório 
4/2010, 2/2011, 2/2012-1/2013, 2/2013-1/2014, 1-4/2014, 2/2015, 1/2016, 1/2017), escola 
de direito de são Paulo da fundação getulio vargas, https://direitosp.fgv.br/publicacoes/
icj-brasil, access 11.01.2019. 
The increase in homicide rate, corruption scandals2 and the recent econo-
mic recession have reduced the level of public trust in Brazilian institutions. 
This is shown by the results of the survey on Justice confidence Index (“Índice 
de confiança na Justiça”). This Index reveals a drop in public confidence in all 
the most important institutions (see graph 2).  according to its data, the most 
2  The corruption scandal “car wash operation” (Operação Lava Jato) launched in 2014, the 
arrest of the former President luiz Inácio lula da silva in 2018, the corruption charge against 
President Michel Miguel elias temer lulia, among others.
Graph 2. 
The level of citizen trust in 
selected Brazilian institutions, 
according to Justice confidence 
Index (2010-2017)
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cent of respondents claimed to trust the armed forces and only 6 percent de-
clared trust in the federal government. Public confidence and trust in Police 
were very low in 2017 – about 26 percent of respondents expressed confidence 
in this institution, compared with 40 percent in 2010. The Brazilians also have 
low confidence in their Judicial Power. In 2017, only 24 percent of surveyed 
respondents said that they trust in this Power (see graph 2). due to the increa-
se in violence and the decline in confidence in Police, the Brazilians and the 
citizens of other latin american countries are in favor of using military forces 
to fight against organized crime (Pion-Berlin, carreras 2017: 8). according to 
Complementary Law No 97 of 19993, the decision on using the armed forces 
to guarantee law and order is the President’s responsibility. The President of 
Brazil can do that on his (her) own initiative or as a request from any of the 
constitutional powers. law clearly defines that for public security purposes 
the armed forces should be used only exceptionally, when the instruments 
provided for it in the constitution have been exhausted (Lei Complementar 
No 97). Moreover, Brazilian armed forces are also responsible for the preven-
tive actions against cross-border and environmental crimes. They cooperate 
with the federal institutions, providing logistics and intelligence support. They 
can use various measures, including air, land and river patrols, searching of 
vessels, motor vehicles, people and aircraft or arrest in flagrante delicto. since 
the constitution was enacted in 1988, up to now the armed forces have been 
intervening “for the guarantee of law and order” during strikes (e.g., 1995 and 
2001), during the visits of foreign dignitaries, political summits and sports 
events (e.g., the 1992 “rio de Janeiro earth summit”, the 2014 world cup, 
the 2016 summer olympics) and assisting police forces in favelas to curb the 
drug trade and other violent crimes in major cities (samset 2014: 9). The first 
intervention of the armed forces in favelas took place in rio de Janeiro in 
1994 and in 1995. nevertheless, “operation rio 1994–1995” did not bring 
the expected results – the intervention did not reduce crime and the cases of 
abuse of power were being reported (folha de s. Paulo 1994). Brazilian armed 
forces have also been involved in the favela Pacification Program. This pro-
ject was launched in 2008 in order to take back state control of rio de Janeiro 
favelas. There were a few phases of “pacification”: the introduction of a large 
number of security forces to clear the favela areas from the crime groups, im-
plementation of the Pacification Peace units (uPP) to establish a permanent 
police presence, implementation of the uPP social to introduce the program, 
delivered by the municipal government in order to re-integrate residents of 
pacified favelas back into the city through access to public and private services 
(carvalho, Berg, galal, teunisse 2017: 115–117). In december 2010, the Bra-
zilian Ministry of defense, in agreement with the government of the state of 
3  amended by Complementary Law 117 of the 2nd of september 2004 and Complementary 
Law 136 of the 25th of august 2010.
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rio de Janeiro, formed “Pacification forces”. They were supposed to cooperate 
with the state forces to ensure the safety of the population, until the Police 
Pacification units could be installed in two favelas of rio de Janeiro: com-
plexo da Penha and complexo da alemão (Diretriz Ministerial No 15/2010)4. 
once again, “Pacification forces” were used to fight against organized crime 
in complexo da Maré (the north Zone of rio de Janeiro) between april 2014 
and June 2015 (Kassab, rosen 2018: 20–21).
source: own elaboration on the basis of Séries históricas anuais de taxa de letalidade violenta 
no estado do Rio de Janeiro e grandes regiões, Instituto de segurança Pública, 2019, http://
www.ispdados.rj.gov.br/arquivos/seriesHistoricasletalidadeviolenta.pdf access 1.02.2019.   
for the first few years the favela Pacification Program has generated 
positive outcomes: the security of people has improved and the number of 
reported violent deaths in pacified favelas decreased; e.g. in 2012 the rate of 
violent death was 29 per 100,000 rio de Janeiro state residents, in compari-
son with 49 per 100,000 in 2000 (see graph 3). But nowadays, the rise of vio-
lent crime in rio de Janeiro as well as at the national level can be observed. 
according to experts, it has been caused by Brazil’s economic recession, by 
the corruption scandals and by fierce competition among drug trafficking 
organizations. Moreover, the lack of serious follow-up investments because 
of economic recession have influenced on decline in support for the Pro-
gram among the residents of favelas (dias carneiro 2017). after months of 
escalating violence in rio de Janeiro and the mass robberies during carni-
val, President Michel temer signed decree no 9288 on the 16th of february 
2018. This document allowed the federal government to intervene militarily 
in the Brazil’s second largest city in order to guarantee the public security. 
authorities appointed general walter souza Braga netto to the position of 
federal intervener in rio de Janeiro (decreto no 9288).  The intervention, 
ended on the 31st of december 2018, has been positively assessed by general 
Braga netto. from March to november the number of homicides in rio de 
Janeiro dropped by 6 percent, the number of robberies of cargo-carrying 
4  They operated from december 2010 to July 2012.
Graph 3.  
The rate of violent deaths in 
the state of rio de Janeiro 
(2000-2018)
290
Artículos y ensayos vehicles fell by 20 percent, auto theft declined by 8 percent and street rob-
beries – by 6 percent. at the same time, the number of people killed in police 
operations increased by about 38 percent and more than 90 police officers 
were killed in 2018 (alves 2018). However, some experts believe that mili-
tary intervention will not solve the problem of violence and insecurity in rio 
de Janeiro. In their opinion, the authorities have opted for the easy and fast 
solutions, in response to the citizen demand for the effective security mea-
sures and they have sent army troops to the streets. But the struggle against 
organized crime requires the long-term strategies, instead of the short-term 
solutions, offered by the state (Muggah 2018). The current Brazilian authori-
ties also try to face these challenges. The new President Jair Messias Bolso-
naro promised, during his campaign, the determined fight against corrup-
tion and organized crime. The signing by President, on the 15th of January 
2019, of a decree easing restrictions on civilians to possession of firearms 
was the first step towards keeping his promises (Mazui, Barbiéri 2019). 
Moreover, the new Minister of Justice and Public security, sérgio fernan-
do Moro, has presented the project of a new anti-crime bill. The proposed 
changes include obligating convicts to begin serving their sentences after 
the first appeal is denied, recognizing of militias and drug trafficking gangs 
as organized criminal groups and fighting with illegal campaign financing. 
The first amendment relates mainly to wealthy and well-connected people, 
who – despite the judicial sentence – have remained free, while their appeals 
have been going on through courts. furthermore, the bill would grant more 
protection to police officers who kill during operations, by specifying the 
situations that could be considered as defensive actions. The courts could re-
duce the sentence to half or cause an acquittal if the self-defense act happens 
due to “reasonable fear, surprise or violent emotion” (Mattoso, della coleta 
2019). The project also includes tougher penalties for notorious criminals 
and introduction of strict security measures in prisons for the leaders of vio-
lent gangs (The new york times 2019). Many experts and politicians praise 
the project of anti-crime bill. They believe there is a need to introduce the 
legislative reforms for improving the quality and efficiency of the Brazilian 
judicial system. They also support the measures proposed for combatting 
financial crimes and the efforts to reduce widespread impunity enjoyed by 
perpetrators of crimes (Melo, Miotto 2019). on the other hand, they voice 
their concerns about the practical application of a more lenient definition of 
self-defense. However, the Minister Moro ensures that the new self-defense 
bill “is not a license to kill” (Mattoso, della coleta 2019). Moreover, in the 
opinion of the Brazilian forum for Public security, the project makes no 
reference to some important issues, like the changes in functioning of police 
at both state and federal level or the fight against police corruption (uol 
notícias 2019). The final form of the future anti-crime law will be known 
after consultation with experts and the political groups and after receiving 
the approval of the national congress. 
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Conclusions 
The fight against organized crime is the one of the most important priorities 
for the Brazilian government. In recent years, the authorities have introduced 
many important public security and justice reforms. They ratified the united 
nations convention against transnational organized crime and adopted 
a new law. Moreover, Brazilian authorities have also tried to remove the fun-
damental causes of organized crime: economic inequality, poverty, unemploy-
ment, low level of education and easy access to drugs and weapons.  However, 
after several years of decline, the level of violence is rising (see graphs 1 and 
3), especially in the north-eastern region of Brazil and in the country’s largest 
cities. according to experts, the economic recession, the rise in unemploy-
ment and the corruption scandals, involving the highest political and corpo-
rate elites, have also contributed to the rising rates of violent crime. Moreover, 
Brazilian authorities must face the threat posed by large domestic criminal 
groups, like Primeiro comando da capital or comando vermelho, who are 
involved in the international drugs trade. a brutal fight between rival drug 
gangsters and the police contributes to the high level of homicide rates, inclu-
ding accidental victims as well. 
The primary institutions of the Brazilian criminal justice system are the 
law enforcement, prosecution, defense lawyers and the courts. In accordance 
with the constitution, the state police forces (civil and Military) are predo-
minately responsible for maintaining public order and preventing, detecting 
and investigating criminal activities. It is worth adding that Brazilian armed 
forces are also regularly used to support police in the fight against criminal 
groups.
However, many researchers recognize the need for a  reform of the po-
lice and judicial system to make the struggle against organized crime more 
effective. They mainly criticize the poor training, the insufficient investment 
in equipment and the poor wages for lower ranking police officers. These are 
the reasons why some of the policemen work additionally as private security 
guards or as “militia” members. Moreover, there is a growing dissatisfaction 
with corruption in police forces and the resort to excessive violence. additio-
nally, there is still much to be done to improve the efficiency of the courts and 
to reduce the high impunity rates. 
It seems that the projects connecting police intervention with social pro-
grams have brought positive results. a more visible police presence has resul-
ted in an important drop in crime and the security of people has improved. 
consequently, the local authorities could start providing social services such 
as schools, healthcare centers or rubbish collection. Moreover, the crime pre-
vention programs have been introduced, especially among young population 
(cano 2006). But the implementation of the programs depends on the proper 
financing and effective management.
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